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DEFINING TERRORISM AS THE PEACETIME EQUIVALENT OF 
WAR CRIMES: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS* 
Michael P. Schar/ 
I. Introduction 
The problem of defining "terrorism" has vexed the international 
community for decades. The United Nations General Assembly has 
repeatedly called for the convening of an international conference to define 
terrorism and distinpish it from legitimate acts in furtherance of national 
liberation struggles. Twelve years ago, representing the United States, I 
delivered a speech in the U.N. Sixth (Legal) Committee, in which I pointed 
out that general definitions of terrorism "are notoriously difficult to achieve 
and dan5erous in what all but the most perfect of definitions excludes by 
chance." I concluded that the history of the effort to deal with the problem 
of terrorism under the League of Nations and in the United Nations 
indicates that "the difficulty of an abstract definition is, as a practical 
matter, insurmountable."3 
A few months after I gave that speech at the United Nations, Alex 
Schmid, the Senior Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Officer at the 
U.N.'s Terrorism Prevention Branch in Vienna, proposed a novel approach 
to the problem of defining terrorism which would draw on the exis.ting 
consensus of what constitutes a war crime.4 After circulating without much 
interest through the United Nations during the last decade, Schmid's 
proposal suddenly gained world-wide attention in April 2004, when it was 
cited by the Supreme Court of India as a way around what the Court 
characterized as the Gordian definitional knot. In Singh v. Bihar, the Indian 
Supreme Court explained: "If the core of war crimes-deliberate attacks on 
• Presented at the War Crimes Research Symposium: "Terrorism on Trial" at Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law, sponsored by the Frederick K. Cox International 
Law Center, on Friday, October 8, 2004. 
t Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law; formerly Counsel to the Counter Terrorism 
Bureau, Attorney-Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence, and Attorney-Adviser for 
U.N. Affairs, U.S. Department of State. 
1 See e~g., G.A. Res. 51, U.N. GAOR, 461b Sess., U.N. Doc. A/46/51 (1991). 
2 See Statement of Michael P. Scharf, United States Adviser to the forty-sixth General 
Assembly, in the Sixth Committee, on Item 125, Terrorism, Press Release USUN 63-(91) 
(Oct. 21, 1991), reprinted in MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE LAW OF lNrERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 699(2001). 
3Jd. 
4 See Alex P. Schmid, The Definition of Terrorism, A Study in Compliance with 
CTL/9/91/2207 for the U.N. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch, Dec. 1992. 
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civilians, hostage-taking and the killing of prisoners is extended to 
peacetime, we could simply define acts of terrorism veritably as 'peacetime 
equivalents of war crimes. "'5 
This article examines the proposal to define terrorism as the peacetime 
equivalent of war crimes in the context of answering two questions: First, 
why might it be useful to define terrorism by reference to the existing laws 
of war? And second, what are the potential negative consequences which 
might counsel against such an approach? Before addressing these 
questions, however, it is useful to provide a brief history of the modem 
international effort to defme terrorism. 
II The International Quest for a General Definition of Terrorism 
,-
( 
In 1987, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 
42/159, recognizing that the effectiveness of the struggle against terrorism 
could be enhanced by the establishment of a generally agreed defmition of 
international terrorism. The issue was initially assigned to the U.N. Sixth 
(Legal) Committee, which had over the years drafted a number of 
conventions addressing specific crimes committed by terrorists, although 
none of these conventions ever used the word "terrorism" let alone 
provided a defmition of the term. When the Sixth Committee failed to 
make progress in reaching a consensus definition of terrorism, the General 
Assembly in 1996 established an ad hoc committee to develop a 
comprehensive framework for dealing with international terrorism. 6 
Foremost among its accomplishments, the ad hoc committee 
developed the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism, which defined terrorism as (1) any activity covered 
by the twelve anti-terrorism treaties; and (2) "any other act intended to 
cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not 
taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when 
the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to 
do or to abstain from doing any act."7 129 States have so far ratified this 
multilateral treaty. This was as close as the international community has 
ever come to adopting a widely accepted general definition of terrorism. 
5 Singh v. Bihar, 2004 SOL Case No. 264, April 2, 2004, para. 16, available at 
http://supremecourtonline.com (upholding conviction under the Indian Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities Act of 1987 of a number of heavily armed individuals who attacked a 
group of police officers). 
6 See G.A. Res. 210, U.N. GAOR Ad Hoc Comm., 52"d Sess., Supp. No. 37, U.N. Doc. 
A/52/37 (1996). 
7 G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (2000). 
2004] DEFINING TERRORISM 361 
Immediately after the events of September 11, 2001, the General 
Assembly established a working group to develop a comprehensive 
convention on international terrorism. In the spirit of cooperation that 
marked the early days after the September 11 attacks, the members of the 
working group nearly reached consensus on the following defmition of 
terrorism: 
[Terrorism is an act] intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to 
any person; or serious damage to a State or government facility, a public 
transportation system, communication system or infrastructure facility ... 
when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to 
do or abstain from doing an act. 8 
The effort hit a snag, however, when Malaysia, on behalf of the 56-
member Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), proposed the 
addition of the following language: 
Peoples' struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, 
aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-
determination in accordance with the principles of international law shall 
not be considered a terrorist crime.9 
According to Nicholas Rostow, General Counsel to the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations, the OIC's proposal intended to exempt acts against 
Israel over the occupied territories and acts against India over Kashmir 
from the definition of terrorism, and to brand violations of the laws of war 
by State military forces such as the Israel Defense Forces as terrorist acts. 10 
When neither side was willing to compromise on this issue, the project was 
shelved indefinitely. 
With work on a general definition of terrorism once again stalled in the 
General Assembly, the U.N. Security Council stepped in to the fray. Acting 
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Council adopted Resolution 
1373, which in essence transformed the Terrorism Financing Convention 
into an obligation of all U.N. member States, requiring them to prohibit 
8 Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism: Report of the Working Group, U.N. 
GAOR 6th Comm., 55th Sess., Agenda Item 164, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/55/L.2 (2000), 
quoted in Surya P. Subedi, The U.N. Response to International Ten-orism in the Aftennath of 
the Terrorist Attacks in America an!J the Problem of the Definition of Ten-orism in 
International Law, 4 INT'LLAWF. DUDROITINT'L 159, 162 (2002). 
9 Subedi, supra note 8, at 163. 
10 Nicholas Rostow, Before and After: The Changed UN Response to Terrorism since 
September lith, 35 CORNELLINT'LL. J.475, 488 (2004). 
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financial support for persons and organizations engaged in terrorism. 11 The 
Council missed an opportunity, however, to adopt a universal definition of 
terrorism when it decided not to include the Terrorism Financing 
Convention's definition of terrorism in Resolution 1373, but rather to leave 
the term undefmed and to allow each State to ascertain its own defmition of 
terrorism. Further, the Council created a committee (The Counter-
Terrorism Committee) to oversee the implementation of the resolution, but 
it did not give the Committee the mandate to promulgate a list of terrorists 
or terrorist organizations to whom financial assistance would be prohibited 
under the resolution. 12 
The Security Council's most recent statement on terrorism came in 
response to a bloody terrorist attack at an elementary school in Russia in 
October 2004. Upon Russia's insistence, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1566, which provides: 
criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to 
cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the 
purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of 
persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from 
doing any act, which constitute offenses within the scope of and as 
defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to 
terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a 
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other 
similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not 
11 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001). 
12 See generally, Eric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 333, 334 (2003) 
(explaining that Resolution 1373 fails to define terrorism or identity specific terrorists). 
At the Club of Madrid International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, 8-
11 March 2005, the Working Group on Legal Responses to Terrorism (which included the 
author of this article) made the following proposal in paragraph 2.6 of its report: "In order to 
help States identify terrorist organizations to whom financial support is prohibited by the 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing and Security Council Resolution 1373 
(2001), the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) established by the Security Council should 
develop a core list of organizations that the CTC determines to be involved, directly or 
indirectly, with acts of financing of terrorism. In developing this list, the CTC should 
employ procedural safeguards to ensure that organizations and individuals associated with 
them which are not so involved are not erroneously included. States would thereafter be 
bound to subject organizations included in the list to the sanctions enumerated in resolution 
1373 (2001). States would also remain free to impose sanctions on non-listed organizations 
that the State determines to be involved in terrorism." (On file with the author). 
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prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent 
with their grave nature (emphasis added).13 
363 
At first blush this clause seems to be a general defmition of terrorism, 
similar to that contained in the Terrorist Financing Convention. But due to 
the inclusion of the italicized language (which was required to gain 
consensus), this clause actually does no more than reaffirm that there can be 
no justification for committing any of the acts prohibited in the twelve 
counter-terrorism conventions; a sentiment that was expressed in numerous 
past General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. 
III. The Case for Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime Equivalent of War 
Crimes 
Terrorism can occur during armed conflict or during peacetime 
(defined as the non-existence of armed conflict). When terrorism is 
committed in an international or internal armed conflict (including a 
guerilla war or insurgency), it is covered by the detailed provisions of the 
four 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols of 1977.14 
These International Humanitarian law ("IHL") conventions provide very 
specific definitions of a wide range of prohibited conduct; they apply to 
both soldiers and civilian perpetrators; they trigger command responsibility; 
and they create universal jurisdiction to prosecute those who engage in 
prohibited acts. The Conventions prohibit use of violence against non-
combatants, hostage taking, and most of the other atrocities usually 
committed by terrorists. In addition, the Conventions and Additional 
13 S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5053rct mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 
(2004). 
14 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (First Geneva 
Convention); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
75 U.N.T.S. 31 (Second Geneva Convention); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (Third Geneva 
Convention); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Fourth Geneva Convention); 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
(Protocol I); and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, December 12, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (Protocol II). 190 States have ratified the four Geneva 
Conventions, 150 States have ratified Protocol I, and 125 States have ratified Protocol II. 
See http://untreaty.un.org/English. 
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Protocols contain several provisions aimed specifically at acts of terrorism 
committed during armed conflict. 15 
The key to whether the lliL conventions apply to acts of terrorism is 
the "armed conflict threshold." By their terms, these lliL conventions do 
not apply to "situations of internal disturbances and tensions such as riots 
and isolated and sporadic acts of violence. " 16 In those situations, terrorism 
is not covered by the laws of war, but rather by a dozen anti-terrorism 
conventions, which outlaw hostage-taking/7 hijacking/ 8 aircraft19 and 
maritime sabotage/0 attacks at airports,21 attacks against diplomats and 
government officials/2 attacks against U.N. peacekeepers,23 use ofbombs24 
15 SeeN Geneva Convention, Oct. 21 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.287 (stating that 
collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited). 
(Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 4, 16 I.L.M. 1391. Article 51(2) of Protocol I (applicable to 
international armed conflicts) provides: "The civilian population as such, as well as 
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary. 
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited." Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Convention of August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609. Article 4(d) of Additional Protocol II (16 I.L.M 1442) (applicable to internal 
armed conflicts) provides: "the following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 
are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever ... "Article 13 of 
Additional Protocol II states: The Civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians 
shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is 
to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited." 
16 Waldemar Solf, The Status of Combatants in Non-International Armed Conflicts Under 
Domestic Law and Transnational Practice, 33 AM. U.L. REv. 53, 62-63 (1983), quoting 
Article 1 (2) of Protocol II. 
17 See International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, TIAS 
11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 (138 State parties). 
18 See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,22 
U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (177 State parties). 
19 See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971,24 U.S.T. 564,974 U.N.T.S. 177 (180 State parties). 
20 See Convention and Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, I.M.O. Doc. SV A/CON/15, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 
668 (52 State parties). 
21 See Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474 (148 State 
parties). 
22 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 
U.N.T.S. 167 (146 State parties). 
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or biological, chemical or nuclear materials, 25 and providing fii1ancial 
support to terrorist organizations.26 These peacetime anti-terrorism 
Conventions establish universal jurisdiction to prosecute perpetrators, 
require states where perpetrators are found to either prosecute them or 
extradite them, and establish a duty to provide judicial cooperation for other 
states. 
While some of the anti-terrorism Conventions are widely ratified, only 
fifty countries have ratified all twelve treaties. Moreover, there are 
significant gaps in the regime of the peacetime anti-terrorism conventions. 
For example, assassinations of businessmen, engineers, journalists and 
educators are not covered, while similar attacks against diplomats and 
public officials are prohibited. Attacks or acts of sabotage by means other 
than explosives against a passenger train or bus, or a water supply or 
electric power plant, are not covered; while similar attacks against an 
airplane or an ocean liner would be included. Placing anthrax into an 
envelope would not be covered; nor would most forms of cyber-terrorism. 
Additionally, acts of psychological terror that do not involve physical injury 
are not covered, even though placing a fake bomb in a public place or 
sending fake anthrax through the mails can be every bit as traumatizing to a 
population as an actual attack. 
Defining terrorism as the peacetime equivalent of war crimes would 
fill most of these gaps. Moreover, it would make it clearer that States have 
a right to use military force in self-defense against a terrorist group 
physically located within the boundaries of another state. As described 
below, some domestic and international judicial bodies have already 
applied the laws of war to peacetime acts of terrorism, thereby setting a 
precedent for an approach that lowers the armed conflict threshold to equate 
acts of terrorism with war crimes. 
A. The Juan Carlos Abella Human Rights Case 
An international body first considered this question in the Juan Carlos 
Abella v. Argentina case, decided by the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights in 1997.27 The case concerned the January 23, 1989 attack 
23 See Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Dec. 9, 
1994, 34 I.L.M. 482 (entered into force on January 15, 1999)(29 State parties). 
24 See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 
2149 U.N.T.S. 284 (123 State parties). 
25 See Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, 1456 
U.N.T.S. 124 (95 State parties). 
26 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 
1999, 39 I.L.M. 270, 2178 U.N.T.S. 228 (117 State parties). 
27 See Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 55/97,0EA/Ser.L/ 
Vill.98, doc. 6 rev. (Apr. 13, 1998). 
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by forty-two civilians, armed with civilian weapons, on the La Tablada 
military barracks in Argentina during peacetime. The Argentine 
government sent 1,500 troops to subdue this terrorist attack. Allegedly, 
after four hours of fighting, the civilian attackers tried to surrender by 
waiving white flags, but the Argentine troops refused to accept their 
surrender and the fighting raged on for another thirty hours until most of the 
attackers were killed or badly wounded by incendiary weapons. 
The Inter-American Commission first held that international 
humanitarian law (the laws of war) was part of its subject matter 
jurisdiction by implied reference in Article 27(1) of the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights.28 Next, the Commission held that the 
confrontation at the La Tablada barracks was not merely an internal 
disturbance or tension (in which case it would not qualify as an armed 
conflict subject to the laws of war). The Commission stated that 
international humanitarian law "does not require the existence of large scale 
and generalized hostilities or a situation comparable to a civil war in which 
dissident armed groups exercise control over parts of national territory." 
The Commission found the confrontation at the La Tablada barracks to 
qualify as an armed conflict because it involved a carefully plmmed, 
coordinated and executed armed attack against a quintessential military 
objective-a military base, notwithstanding the small number of attackers 
involved and the short time frame of the fighting. 29 The Commission thus 
stated that had the Argentinean troops in fact refused to accept the surrender 
of the civilian attackers, or had they in fact used weapons of a nature to 
cause superfluous inju~ or unnecessary suffering; this would have 
constituted a war crime. 3 However, "because of the incomplete nature of 
the evidence," the Commission was unable to find against Argentina 
concerning these allegations.31 
The Juan Carlos Abella case is an important precedent because it 
lowers the armed conflict threshold so that many terrorist situations could 
now trigger the standard of the laws of war. But it also highlights several 
potential problems with applying the laws of war to terrorist attacks. First, 
by confining their attack to a military barracks, the terrorists (who in this 
case carried their arms openly) acted lawfully under the laws of war. 
Conversely, the laws of war would constrain the methods the government 
could use to quell the attack. 
28 See id. paras. 157-168. 
29 !d. at paras. 155-156. 
30 !d. at paras. 180,189. 
31 !d. at para. 185. 
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B. The United States' Response to the 9/11 Attacks 
In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Scott Silliman, 
the Executive Director of the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security 
at Duke University School of Law, explained that since the United States 
was not in a state of armed conflict with al Qaeda on the morning of 
September 11, 2001, the attacks by al Qaeda could not be considered 
violations of the laws ofwar.32 Although al Qaeda had been responsible for 
a few prior sporadic attacks against the United States, including the 
bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the 
attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, and the United States had attacked al 
Qaeda's Afgan training bases with cruise missiles in 1998, these did not 
rise to the level of protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups as required to trigger the laws of 
war.33 
Nevertheless, in promulgating the instruments governing the 
prosecution of al Qaeda members before U.S. military commissions, the 
United States made clear that in its view, ongoing mutual hostilities were 
not required to qualifY the attacks of September 11 as an armed conflict. 
Rather, "[a] single hostile act or attempted act may provide sufficient basis 
for the nexus [between the conduct and armed hostilities] so long as its 
magnitude or severity rises to the level of an 'armed attack' ... or the number, 
power, stated intent or organization of the force with which the actor is 
associated is such that the act or attempted act is tantamount to an attack by 
an armed force."34 Applying this novel definition which reduces the armed 
conflict threshold to require merely a single severe terrorist act, the Military 
Commissions have charged several members of al ~aeda with committing 
war crimes in relation to the attacks of September 11. 5 
32 See On DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: 
Hearing on Review of Military Terrorism Tribunals Before Congress, 107th Cong. (2001), 
available at 2001 WL 26187921. 
33 See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal Jurisdiction), No. IT-94-l-AR72, para. 70, (ICTY 1995), available at http://www.un. 
org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51 002.htm. 
34 Department of Defense Military Commission Instruction No. 2, Crimes and Elements 
for Trials by Military Commission, § 5(C) (April 30, 2003), available at http://www. 
defenselink.millnews/May2003/d20030430milcom instno2.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2005). 
35 See Press Releases, U.S. Department of Defense, Two Guantanamo Detainees Charged 
(Feb. 24, 2004), Additional Military Commission Charges Referred (Jul. 14, 2004) available 
at www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004. The Defense has challenged the jurisdiction of the 
military commissions over acts committed outside of an armed conflict in the traditional 
meaning of the term, and this issue is likely to wind its way through the courts in the years 
ahead. See Defense Motion to Modify Charges-Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction-
Offenses Must be Committed During International Armed Conflict, United States v. David 
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C. The Fawaz Yunis Prosecution 
In other contexts, U.S. courts have applied the laws of war to even 
minor terrorist acts committed during peacetime. Consider the case of 
United States v. Yunis. 36 Fawaz Yunis was a member of the Amal militia 
which opposed the presence of the PLO in Lebanon. On June 11, 1985, 
Yunis hijacked a Jordanian airliner from Beirut and attempted to fly it to 
the PLO Conference in Tunis to make a political statement. At his trial in 
the United States for committing acts of terrorism (hijackin~ and hostage 
taking), Yunis sought to use the obedience to orders defense. 7 This is the 
defense made famous in the case of Lieutenant William L. Calley who was 
tried for the My Lai massacre in Vietnam.38 According to U.S. law, "acts 
of a subordinate done in compliance with an unlawful order given him by 
his superior are excused ... unless [the order] is one which a man of 
ordinary sense and understanding would ... know to be unlawful ... "39 
The Yunis court instructed the jury that Yunis could prevail on the 
obedience to orders defense if it found that the Amal Militia was a "military 
organization." To make that finding, however, the judge indicated that the 
jury had to determine that (1) the Amal Militia had a hierarchical command 
structure; (2) it generally conducted itself in accordance with the laws of 
war; and (3) its members had a distinctive symbol and carried their arms 
openly.40 Although the jury did not ftnd that the Amal Militia met this test, 
at least some terrorist organizations would qualify as a "military 
organization" under it, and thus have the right to rely on the obedience to 
orders defense. 
D. The Ahmed Extradition Case 
In the Mahmoud El-Abed Ahmed Extradition case, the U.S. court used 
the rules of armed conflict by analogy to determine whether a peacetime 
terrorist act could qualify for the political offense exception to extradition.41 
In 1986, Ahmed attacked an Israeli passenger bus near Tel Aviv, and then 
fled to the United States. At his extradition hearing, his lawyer, former 
M. Hicks (U.S. Military Commission) (Oct. 4, 2004) available at www.defenselink.mil/ 
news/ Aug2004/commissions _motions .html. 
36 United States v. Fawaz Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (1991). 
37 Id. at 1095. 
38 United States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534 (1973). 
39 Fawaz Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1097. 
40 !d. 
41 Ahmed v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 408 (E.D. N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 910 F. 2d 1063 (2nd 
Cir. 1990). 
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U.S. Attorney-General Ramsey Clark, argued that this was a non-
extraditable political offense. 
The Court held that a person relying on the political offense exception 
must prove the acceptability of his offense under the laws of war, even 
when an armed conflict did not exist as such at the time of the offense.42 
The Court found that Ahmed's acts did not qualify for the political offense 
exception because they violated Additional Protocol II's prohibition on 
targeting civilians.43 While this result ensured that Ahmed would be 
prosecuted in Israel, the implication of the holding is that if a terrorist 
targets military personnel or a government installation, the terrorist would 
be protected by the political offense exception. 
IV Negative Implications of Applying the Laws of War to Peacetime Acts 
of Terrorism 
The Abella, Yunis, Ahmed, and al Qaeda cases show that domestic and 
international judicial bodies are beginning to apply the laws of war to 
terrorist acts outside the traditional concept of armed conflict. These cases 
thus provide a precedent for treating terrorism as the peacetime equivalent 
of war crimes. But these cases also indicate some of the problems inherent 
to this approach, which stem from the fact that the laws of war establish 
rights as well as obligations for those over whom they apply. 
A. Unlawful Verses Lawful Combatants 
The terms "lawful" and "unlawful-combatants" are designed to draw a 
distinction between armed forces, which are a legitimate target of war, and 
the civilian population, which is not. To promote the distinction, only 
lawful combatants are entitled to the protection afforded by the laws of war, 
including the combatant's privilege and Prisoner of War status. 
Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, to qualify as a lawful combatant 
members of a militia had to inter alia have a fixed distinctive sign 
recognizable at a distance, something most terrorists would not have.44 In 
recognition of the realities of modern guerrilla warfare, however, the 1977 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions provides that, while combatants 
should clearly distinguish themselves from civilians, it may be that "the 
nature of hostilities" will in some cases effectively preclude such 
distinction. In such case, members of a fighting force will nevertheless 
42 I d. at 404. 
43 I d. at 407. 
44 Geneva Convention III, supra note 14, art. 4. 
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retain "combatant" status and be entitled to POW status upon capture, 
provided they "[carry] arms openly" during actual military engagements.45 
It is for this reason that the United States has not ratified Additional 
Protocol I, which it felt gave too much protection to terrorist groups.46 But 
the Protocol has been ratified by 155 countries, including seventeen of the 
nineteen members of NATO and three of the Permanent Members of the 
Security Council. 47 The Protocol has been invoked as reflecting customary 
international law in various conflicts by governments, U.N. investigative 
bodies, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.48 The United 
States, itself, argued that the Protocol represented customary International 
law in advocating that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia should have jurisdiction over breaches of the Protocol.49 U.S. 
soldiers are subject to arrest and prosecution/extradition for breaches of the 
Protocol when they are present in the territory of any State Party. When the 
U.S. deploys troops on a U.N. peace-keeping mission, the United Nations 
requires that they be subject to Protocol I. 5° Finally, as a matter of policy 
on the conduct of hostilities during coalition actions, the United States has 
implemented the rules of the Protocol because of the need to coordinate 
rules of engagement with its coalition partners. 51 
Consequently, if the laws of war are extended to peacetime acts of 
terrorism, than many terrorists would be able to qualify for the rights of 
combatants under the less stringent standard of Additional Protocol I. 
B. The Combatant's Privilege and Collateral Damage Doctrine 
If terrorism is defmed as the peacetime equivalent of war crimes, 
terrorists could rely on the "combatant's privilege," under which 
45 Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 44(3). 
46 Though the United States signed the Protocol during the Carter Administration, the 
Regan Administration subsequently decided not to seek ratification because of fears that [it] 
would legitimize the claims of the Palestine Liberation Organization to prisoner of war 
privileges for its combatants and promote various liberation movements to state or quasi 
state status. See Michael P. Scharf, The United States and the International Criminal Court: 
The ICC's Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. 
Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, citing THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW 
COMES OF AGE 178-79 (1998). 
47 !d. at 93. 
48 !d. 
49 !d. at 95. 
50 Idat 94. 
51 !d. 
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combatants are immune from prosecution for certain common crimes. 52 For 
example, killing a combatant is justified homicide, not murder. This means 
that terrorist attacks on military, police, or other government personnel 
would not be prosecutable or extraditable offenses. Similarly, kidnapping 
combatants constitutes a lawful taking of prisoners. Consequently, taking 
military or government personnel hostage would generally not constitute a 
cnme. 
Moreover, under the combatant's privilege, government installations 
are a lawful target of war. Though citing Alex Schmid's defmitional 
approach with approval, the recent judgment of the Indian Supreme Court 
cautioned that "[i]f terrorism is defined strictly in terms of attacks on non-
military targets, a number of attacks on military installations and soldiers' 
residences could not be included."53 Thus, terrorist attacks on military, 
police, or government buildings would not be regarded as criminal; nor 
would attacks on navy vessels or aircraft. The collateral damage doctrine 
would apply, such that injury or deaths to civilians would not be regarded 
as criminal so long as the target was a government installation, and 
reasonable steps were taken to minimize the risk to innocent civilians. 
Thus, under the proposal to define terrorism as the peacetime equivalent of 
war crimes, if al Qaeda had attacked the Pentagon not with airliners full of 
innocent passengers, but with a truck bomb, that would have been a lawful 
act of war, not terrorism. 
C. Assassination 
Another problem with the proposal is that it would permit 
assassination of political leaders while they are within their own borders. 
The Internationally Protected Person Convention only protects heads of 
state, high level officials, and diplomats when they are on a mission outside 
of their home state.54 The laws of war, wh~ch would apply to such persons 
while within their country, make it a war crime to kill "treacherously,"55-
understood as prohibiting assassination.56 But this prohibition has been 
52 Richard Baxter, The Municipal and International Law Basis of Jurisdiction Over War 
Crimes, 28 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 382, 384-85 (1951); Waldemar Solf, The Status of Combatants 
in Non-International Armed Conflicts Under Domestic Law and Transnational Practice, 33 
AM. U.L. REv. 53, 58 (1983). 
53 Singh v. Bihar, 2004 SOL Case No. 264, Apr. 2, 2004, para.16, available at http:// 
www.supremecourtonline.com/cases/9520.html. 
54 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, art. 2, I 037 U.N.T.S. 167. 
55 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex, Oct. 
18, 1907, art. 23 (b), 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539. 
56 U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, the Law of Land Warfare, art. 31 (1956) (Army Field Manual 
No. 27-10, Wash., D.C.). 
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narrowly interpreted to, for example, permit targeting military or civilian 
commanders during a conflict.57 Executive Order 12,333, which prohibits 
U.S. government personnel from engaging in assassination, 58 has been 
subject to a similarly narrowly interpretation. 
Shortly after the 1986 bombing of Libyan leader Colonel Muammar 
Qaddafi's personal quarters in Tripoli, Senior Army lawyers made public a 
memorandum that concluded that Executive Order 12,333 was not intended 
to prevent the United States from acting in self-defense against "legitimate 
threats to national security" even during peacetime. 59 More recently, the 
United States has begun to use unmanned Predator drone aircraft, equipped 
with Helfire missiles, to hunt down members of the al Qaeda terrorist 
organization throughout the world, even outside the zone of conflict. 60 If 
the laws of war apply to terrorists in peacetime it would logically follow 
that they have the same right as governments to target military or civilian 
commanders and others who pose a threat to the security of their insurgency 
or self-determination movement. 
D. POW Status 
Another problem is that defining terrorism as the peacetime equivalent 
of war crimes might entitle some terrorists to POW status, which requires 
that they be given special rights beyond those afforded to common 
prisoners. By way of analogy, one might examine the case of United States 
v. Noriega,61 in which General Noriega argued that Article 22 of the Third 
Geneva Convention required that he not be interned in a penitentiary.62 
Although the District Court held that Article 22 did not apply to POWs 
convicted of common crimes, it agreed that General Noriega was entitled to 
POW status and therefore entitled to the protections of Article 13 ("humane 
treatment"); Article 14 ("respect for their persons and their honour"); and 
Article 16 ("equal treatment"). The members ofal Qaeda being tried by the 
U.S. Military Commissions in Guantanamo Bay have made a similar 
57 W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination, 
ARMY LAW, Dec. 1989 at 5. 
58 Exec. Order No. 12,333,46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 8, 1981). 
59 Parks, supra note 57, at 8. 
60 See Michael P. Scharf, In the Cross Hairs of a Scary Idea, THE WASH. PosT, Apr. 25, 
2004, at Bl. 
61 United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
62 Article 22 provides: "Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land 
and affording every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness. Except in particular cases which 
are justified by the interest of the prisoners themselves, they shall not be interned in 
penitentiaries." Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, art.22, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
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argument in their habeas petitions, contending that as POWs under the 
Geneva Conventions they cannot lawfully be tried by military 
commission. 63 
Even if they are ultimately denied POW status, under the Geneva 
Conventions the al Qaeda detainees are still entitled to fundamental 
guarantees of humane treatment and may not be tortured or degraded. In 
contrast, if the members of al Qaeda were deemed common criminals not 
subject to the protections of the laws of war, the United States would 
actually have more leeway in how it treats al Qaeda members that are 
captured and detained outside of its borders. 
E. The Obedience to Orders Defense 
Finally, as the Fawas Yunis Case demonstrated, defining terrorism as 
the peacetime equivalent of war crimes would enable terrorists to rely on 
the obedience to orders defense. This may be a fair tradeoff for providing 
the prosecution with the use of the doctrine of command responsibility, but 
at least in some cases it will render it more difficult to obtain a conviction 
of accused terrorists. While the defense is not available with respect to acts 
that our manifestly unlawful, such as intentionally targeting civilians or 
taking hostages, it would apply to those lower down in the chain of 
command who are ordered to perform specific tasks, such as procuring 
explosives or an airline schedule or a fake passport which are not in 
themselves manifestly war crimes. 
V Conclusion 
The proposal to defme terrorism as the peacetime equivalent of war 
crimes necessitates application of the laws of war to terrorists. The 
approach would fill some of the gaps of the current anti-terrorism treaty 
regime. It might permit the exercise of more forceful measures that might 
not be permissible under the rubric of law enforcement. It would give the 
prosecution the ability to argue the doctrine of command responsibility, 
which was not previously applicable to peacetime acts. It will also 
encourage terrorist groups to play by the rules of international humanitarian 
law. Conversely, the approach virtually declares open season for attacks on 
government personnel and facilities. It would encourage insurrection by 
reducing the personal risks of rebels, and it would enhance the perceived 
standing of insurgents by treating them as combatants rather than common 
criminals. 
63 At the time this article went to press, at least one federal court had agreed with this 
argument. See Salim Ahmed Hamdan v. Donald H. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp. 152 (D.C. 2004), 
at 13-35. 
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It is important that those advocating this new approach to the 
defmition of terrorism be fully aware of all the legal consequences that arise 
from the approach. It is no panacea, and in the fmal analysis the negative 
consequences may render it another dead end in the enduring struggle to 
defme terrorism. 
